*BOOK*The Reliance of the Traveller. Version 1.04
*AUTHOR*Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al-Misri
*STAMP* "#$%&'(:A>=@@?ICEDMNOHKQQTTPNWPY
*EXEVER*08
*COPYRIGHTS*This book was obtained from the internet (http://www.geocities.com/Hollywood/Chateau/9304/) as a public domain file and added to this program.
*TYPING*This book is based on the translation by Noah Ha Mim Keller. The file that we obtained contains mistakes which are not in Noah Keller's translation, and which are currently being corrected.
*END*
*1*Introduction: The Reliance of the Traveller
@A classical manual of Islamic Sacred Law by Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al Misri (D. 769/1368), with the English text, commentary and appendices translated by Noah Ha Mim Keller.
*1*BOOK A: SACRED KNOWLEDGE
@CONTENTS:
The Knowledge of Good and Bad a1.0
Unaided Intellect Cannot Know Allah's Rules a1.2
Meaning of Good and Bad a1.4
Those Unreached by Prophets Are Not Responsible a1.5
The Superiority of Sacred Knowledge over Devotions a2.0
Koranic Evidence a2.1
Hadith Evidence a2.2
Other Reasons a2.7
The Blameworthiness of Seeking Knowledge for Other Than Allah a3.0
Meaning of for Other Than Allah a3.1
Koranic Evidence a3.2
Hadith Evidence a3.3
Personally Obligatory Knowledge a4.0
Faith a4.2
A Muslim's responsibility in tenets of faith a4.2
Belief in problematic scriptural expressions a4.3
Works a4.5
When one must learn rites and duties a4.4
How much one must teach one's children a4.6
Knowledge of the Heart a4.7
Communally Obligatory Knowledge a5.0
Religious Sciences a5.1
This-Worldly Knowledge a5.2
Recommended Knowledge a6.0
Subjects That Are Not Sacred Knowledge a7.0
Unlawful Knowledge a7.2
Offensive Knowledge a7.3
Permissible Knowledge a7.4
*2*Chapter A1.0: The Knowledge of Good and Bad
@A1.1:
(Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf:) There is no disagreement among the scholars of the Muslims that the source of legal rulings for all the acts of those who are morally responsible is Allah Most Glorious.
@A1.2: Unaided Intellect Cannot Know Allah's Rules
The question arises. Is it possible for the mind alone, unaided by Allah's messengers and revealed scriptures, to know rulings, such that someone not reached by a prophet's invitation would be able through his own reason to know Allah's rule concerning his actions? Or is this impossible?
@A1.3:
The position of the Ash`aris, the followers of Abul Hasan Ash`ari, is that the mind is unable to know the rule of Allah about the acts of those morally responsible except by means of His messengers and inspired books.
For minds are in obvious disagreement about acts. Some minds find certain acts good, others find them bad.
Moreover, one person can be of two minds about one and the same action. Caprice often wins out over the intellect, and considering something good or bad comes to be based on mere whim.
So it cannot be said that an act which the mind deems good is therefore good in the eyes of Allah, its performance called for, and its doer rewarded by Allah; or that whatever the mind feels to be bad is thus bad in the eyes of Allah, its non-performance called for and its doer punished by Allah.
@A1.4: Meaning of Good and Bad
The basic premise of this school of thought is that the good of the acts of those morally responsible is what the Lawgiver (syn. Allah or His messenger (Allah bless him and give him peace) ) has indicated is good by permitting it or asking it be done. And the bad is what the Lawgiver has indicated is bad by asking it not be done.
The good is not what reason considers good, nor the bad what reason considers bad. The measure of good and bad, according to this school of thought, is the sacred Law not reason (dis:W3).
@A1.5: Those Unreached by Prophets Are Not Responsible
According to this school, a person is not morally obligated by Allah to do or refrain from anything unless the invitation of a prophet and what Allah has legislated have reached him (n:w4 discusses Islam's relation to previous prophets' laws).
No one is rewarded for doing something or punished for refraining from or doing something until he knows by means of Allah's messengers, what he is obliged to do or obliged to refrain from.
So whoever lives in such complete isolation that the summons of a prophet and his Sacred Law do not reach him, is not morally responsible to Allah for anything and deserves neither reward nor punishment.
And those who lived in one of the intervals after the death of a prophet and before a new one had been sent were not responsible for anything and deserve neither reward nor punishment.
This view is confirmed by the word of Allah Most High:
"We do not punish until we send a messenger"
(Koran 17:15).
(.Ilm usul al-fiqh (y71) 96-98)
*2*Chapter A2.0: The Superiority of Sacred Knowledge over Devotion
@A2.1: Koranic Evidence
(Nawawi:) Allah most High says:
-1- "Say, Are those who know and those who do not know equal?'" (Koran 39:9).
-2- "Only the knowledgeable of His slaves fear Allah" (Koran 35:28).
-3- "Allah raises those of you who believe and those who have been given knowledge whole degrees" (Koran 58:11).
@A2.2: Hadith Evidence
The Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) said:
-1- "Whoever Allah wishes well, He gives knowledge of religion."
-2- "The superiority of the learned Muslim over the devotee is as my superiority over the least of you."
Then the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) said,
"Allah and His angels, the inhabitants of the heavens and the earths, even the ant in its anthill and the fish, bless for those who teach people what is good."
-3- "When a human being dies, his work comes to an end except for three things: ongoing charity, knowledge benefited from, or a pious son who prays for him."
-4- "A single learned Muslim is harder on the Devil than a thousand worshippers."
-5- "Whoever travels a path seeking knowledge Allah makes easy for him a path to paradise.
"Angels lower their wings for the seeker of knowledge out of pleasure in what he seeks.
"Those in the heavens and the earth, and the very fish in the water ask Allah to forgive the person endowed with Sacred Knowledge.
"The superiority of the learned Muslim over the devotee is like the superiority of the moon over all the stars.
"The learned are the heirs of the prophets. The prophets have not bequeathed dinar nor dirham, but have only left Sacred Knowledge, and whoever takes it has taken an enormous share."
-6- "He who calls others to guidance shall receive the like of the reward of those who follow him without this diminishing their own reward in the slightest. And he who calls others to misguidance shall bear the like of the sins of those who follow him without this diminishing their own sins."
-7- "He who goes forth to seek Sacred Knowledge is in the way of Allah [syn jihad def:09] until he returns."
-8- "This world and what is in it are accursed [dis: w5] except for the remembrance of Allah, that which Allah loves, someone with Sacred Knowledge or someone learning it."
@A2.3
'Ali ibn Abi Talib (Allah be well pleased with him) said,
"The religious scholar is greater in reward than the fighter in the way of Allah who fasts the day and prays the night."
@A2.4
Abu Darda' (Allah be well pleased with him) said,
"Teaching Sacred Knowledge for a brief time is better than spending a night in prayer."
@A2.5
Yahya ibn Abi Kathir said,
"Studying Sacred Knowledge is a prayer."
@A2.6
Sufyan al-Thawri and Shafi'i said,
"There is nothing after what is obligatory that is superior to seeking Sacred Knowledge."
@A2.7: Other Reasons
(Nawawi:) There are similar statements from whole groups of early Muslims I have not mentioned that are like those I have quoted, the upshot of which is that they concur that devoting one's time to Sacred Knowledge is better than devoting it to voluntary fasting or prayer, better than saying "Subhan Allah" (lit. "Exalted is Allah above any limitation"), or other supererogatory devotions.
Among the proofs for this, besides the foregoing, is that:
-1- the benefit of Sacred Knowledge affects both its possessor and the Muslims, while the above mentioned supererogatory works are confined to oneself;
-2- Sacred Knowledge validates, so other acts of worship require it, though not vice versa;
-3- scholars are the heirs of the prophets, while devotees are not characterized as such;
-4- the devote follows the scholar, being led by and imitating him in worship and other acts, obeying him being obligatory and not the other way around;
-5- the benefit and effect of Sacred Knowledge remain after its possesser departs, while supererogatory works cease with the death of their doer;
-6- knowledge is an attribute of Allah Most High;
-7- Sacred Knowledge, meaning the knowledge we are discussing, is a communal obligation (def: c3.2), and it is thus better than the supererogatory. The Imam of the Two Sanctuaries
(A: Juwayni) says in his book alGhiyathi that "the communal obligation is superior to the personal obligation in that the person performing it fulfills the need of the Islamic Nation (Umma) and lifts the obligation from it, while the obligation of the individual is restricted to himself." And success is through Allah (alMajmu' (y108), 1.18-22).
*2* Chapter a3.0: The Blame-worthiness of seeking sacred knowledge for other than Allah
@A3.1: Meaning of for Other Than Allah
(Nawawi:) Know that what we have mentioned about the merit of seeking Sacred Knowledge only applies to the seeker who thereby intends Allah Himself, not some end concerned with this world.
Whoever seeks it for a worldly aim such as money, leadership, rank, prestige, fame, people inclining towards him, defeating opponents in debate, or similar motive, is blameworthy. (A When the basic reason is Allah but other motives play a role, they diminish the merit in the proportion that they enter into it.)
@A3.2: Koranic Evidence
Allah Most High says:
-1- "Whoever wants to cultivate the afterlife We shall increase for him his village, while whoever wants to cultivate this world, we shall give him of it, but he will have no share in the next (Koran 42:20).
-2- "Whoever wants the present world We hasten for him therein whatever We will, for whomever We want, and then consign him to hell, roasting in it condemned and rejected". (Koran 17:18).
-3- "Verily, your Lord is ready at ambush" (Koran 89:14).
-4- "They were not ordered except to worship Allah, making their religion sincere unto Him as pure monotheists" (Koran 98:5).
@A3.3: Hadith Evidence
The Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) said:
-1- "The first person judged on Resurrection Day will be a man martyred in battle.
"He'll be brought forth, Allah will reacquaint him with His blessings upon him and the man will acknowledge them, where-
upon Allah will say, 'What have you done with them?' to which the man will respond, 'I fought to the death for you.'
"Allah will reply, `You lie. You fought in order to be called a hero, and it has already been said.' Then he will be sentenced
and dragged away on his face to be flung into the fire.
"Then a man will be brought forward who learned Sacred Knowledge, taught it to others, and who recited the Koran. Allah
will remind him of His gifts to him and the man will acknowledge them, and then Allah will say. `What have you done with them?' The man will answer. `I acquired Sacred Knowledge, taught it, and recited the Koran, for Your sake.'
"Allah will say, `You lie. You learned so as to be called a scholar, and read the Koran so as to be called a reciter, and it has already been said. `Then he will be sentenced and dragged away on his face to be flung into the fire."
-2- "Anyone who seeks Sacred Knowledge to argue with fools, vie with scholars, or draw people's attention to himself, will take a place in hell."
-3- "The most severely tortured on Resurrection Day shall be the scholar who did not benefit from his knowledge."
@A3.4 Sufyan al-Thawri said.
"No servant increased in knowledge and then in desire for the things of this world, save that he increased in distance from Allah." (Ibid.,1.23-24)
*2*Chapter: a4.0: Personally Obligatory Knowledge
@A4.1: Faith
(Nawawi:) There are three categories of Sacred Knowledge. The first is the personally obligatory (fard al-`ayn, def:c2.1), which is a morally responsible individual's learning the knowledge that the obligatory acts he must perform cannot be accomplished without, such as how the ablution (wudu) and prayer are done and so forth. Its obligatory character is how groups of scholars have interpreted the hadith in the Musnad of Abu Ya'la al-Mawsuli, from Anas, who relates that the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) said,
"Seeking knowledge is an obligation upon every Muslim."
The meaning of this hadith, though the hadith itself is not well authenticated (A: being weak (dis:p9.5) ), is true.
@A4.2: A Muslim's Responsibility in Tenets of Faith
As for the basic obligation of Islam, and what relates to tenets of faith, it is adequate for one to believe in everything brought by the Messenger of Allah (Allah bless him and give him peace) and to credit it with absolute conviction free of any doubt. Whoever does this is not obliged to learn the evidences of the scholastic . The Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) did not require of anyone anything but what we have just mentioned, nor did the first four caliphs, the other prophetic Companions, nor others of the early Muslim community who came after them.
Rather, what befits the common people and vast majority of those learning or possessing Sacred Knowledge is to retrain from discussing the subtleties of scholastic theology, lest corruption difficult to eliminate find its way into their basic religious convictions. Rather, it is fitter for them to confine themselves to contentment with the above-mentioned absolute certainly.
Our Imam Shafi'i (Allah Most High have mercy on him) went to the greatest possible lengths in asserting that engaging in scholastic theology is forbidden. (A: What he meant thereby was the heretical scholastic theology that proliferated in his time and put rationalistic theories ahead of the Koran and sunna, not the science of theology (`ilm al-tawhid) by which Ash`ari and Maturidi scholars (dis: x47) have clarified and detailed the tenets of faith of Sunni Islam, which is an important part of the Islamic sciences.) He insistently emphasized its unlawfulness, the severity of the punishment awaiting those who engage in it, the disgrace of doing it, and the enormity of the sin therein by saying,
"For a servant to meet Allah with any other sin than idolatry (shirk) is better than to meet Him guilty of anything of scholastic theology."
His other statements expressing the same meaning are numerous and well known. But if someone has doubts (Allah be our refuge) about any of the tenets of faith in which belief is obligatory (def: books u and v), and his doubt cannot be eliminated except by learning one of the theologians' proofs, then it is obligatory for him to learn it in order to remove the doubt and acquire the belief in question.
@A4.3: Belief in Problematic Scriptural Expressions
Scholars disagree about the Koranic verses and hadiths that deal with the attributes of Allah (n: such as His `hand' (Koran 48:10), His `eyes' (52:48) or His `nearness' (50:16) ) as to whether they should be discussed in terms of a particular figurative interpretation (ta'wil, def:w6) or not. Some say that they should be figuratively interpreted as befits them (n: interpreting His `hand.' for example, as an allusion to His omnipotence). And this is the more well known of the two positions of the scholastic theologians.
Others say that such verses should not be given a definitive interpretation, but rather their meaning should not be discussed, and the knowledge of them should be consigned to Allah Most High, while at the same time believing in the transcendence of Allah Most High, and that the characteristics of created things do not apply to Him. For example, it should be said we believe that
"the All-merciful is 'established' [Ar. istawa, dis:v1.3] on the Throne" (Koran 20:5),
but we do not know the reality of the meaning of that, nor what is intended thereby, though we believe of Allah Most High that
"there is nothing whatsoever like unto Him" (Koran 42:11),
and that He is above indwelling in created things (hulul, dis:w7), or having the characteristics of temporal, contingent existence (huduth, dis:w8). And this is the path of the early Muslims, or the vast majority of them, and is the safest, for a person is not required to enter into discussions about this.
When one believes in Allah's transcendence above created things, there is no need for debate on it, or for taking risks over what there is neither pressing necessity nor even any real call for. But if the need arises for definitive interpretations to refute someone making unlawful innovations and the like, then the learned may supply them, and this is how we should understand what has come down to us from scholars in this field. And Allah knows best.
@A4.4: Works
A person is not obliged to learn how to perform ablution, the prayer, and so forth, until the act itself is obligatory for him. As for trade, marriage, and so forth, of things not in themselves obligatory, the Imam of the Two Sanctuaries (A: Juwayni), Ghazali, and others say that learning their means and conditions is personally obligatory for anyone who wants to do them. It has also been said that one should not call this knowledge "personally obligatory," but rather say, "It is unlawful to undertake them until one knows the conditions for their legal validity." And this expression is more accurate.
@A4.5: When One Must Learn Rites and Duties
It is obligatory for one to know what is permissible and what is unlawful of food, drink, clothing, and so forth, of things one is unlikely to be able to do without. And likewise for the rulings on treatment of women if one has a wife.
@A4.6: How Much One Must Teach One's Children
Shafi'i and colleagues (Allah have mercy on them) say that fathers and mothers must teach their children what will be obligatory for them after puberty. The guardian must teach the child about purification, prayer, fasting, and so forth; and that fornication, sodomy, theft, drinking, lying, slander, and the like are unlawful; and that he acquires moral responsibility at puberty and what this entails. It has been said that this education is merely recommended, but in fact it is obligatory, as the plain content of its scriptural basis (n: mentioned below) shows. Just as it is mandatory for a guardian to wisely manage his charge's property, this is even more important. The merely recommended is what exceeds this, such as teaching him the Koran, Sacred Law, etiquette, and teaching him what he needs to earn a living.
The evidence for the obligation of teaching a young child is the word of Allah Mighty and Majestic,
"O you who believe, protect yourselves and families from a fire" (Koran 66:6).
'Ali ibn Abi Talib (Allah be well pleased with him), Mujahid, and Qatada say it means. "Teach them that with which they can save themselves from hell,"
@A4.7: Knowledge of the Heart
As for knowledge o the heart, meaning familiarity with the illness of the heart such as envy, pride, and the like (dis:book p.r. and s). Ghazali has said that knowledge of their definitions, causes, remedy, and treatment is personally obligatory. (A: And this is what Ghazali meant when he said that Sufism (Tasawwuf, dis:w9) is personally obligatory for every Muslim. He did not mean that taking a way (tariqa) and sheikh are obligatory, but rather the elimination of unlawful inner traits, which one could conceivably accomplish through the companionship of a single sincere brother.)
Others hold that if the morally responsible individual is endowed with a heart free of all these unlawful diseases, it suffices him, and he is not obliged to learn what will cure them. But if not safe from them he must reflect: if he can purify his heart from them without instruction then he must purify it, just as he must shun fornication and the like without learning the evidence proving he must. But if he cannot rid himself of these unlawful traits except through learning the above mentioned knowledge, then he is personally obliged to. And Allah knows best (al-Majmu' (y 108), 1.24-26).
*2*Chapter A5.0: Communally Obligatory Knowledge
@A5.1: Religious Sciences
(Nawawi) The second category (in of Sacred Knowledge) is what is communally obligatory (fard al-kifaya, def:c3.2), namely the attainment of those Sacred Sciences which people cannot do without in practicing their religion, such as memorizing the Koran and hadith, their ancillary disciplines, methodological principles, Sacred Law, grammar, lexicology, declension, knowledge of hadith transmitters, and of scholarly consensus (ijma'. def:b7) and nonconsensus.
@A5.2: This-Worldly Knowledge
As for learning which is not Sacred Knowledge but is required to sustain worldly existence, such as medicine and mathematics, it too is a communal obligation (ibid.,1.26).
*2*Chapter A6.0: Recommended Knowledge
@A6.1
(Nawawi:) The third category is the supererogatory (def: c4.2), such as in-depth research into the bases of evidences, and elaboration beyond the amount required by the communal obligation, or such as an ordinary Muslim learning the details of nonobligatory acts of worship for the purpose of performing them; though not the work of scholars in distinguishing the obligatory from the nonobligatory, which is a communal obligation in respect to them. And Allah knows best (ibid, 1.27).
*2*Chapter A7.0: Subjects that are Not Sacred Knowledge
@A7.1 (Nawawi:) Having mentioned the categories of Sacred Knowledge the subjects it excludes are those that are unlawful offensive, or permissible.
@A7.2: Unlawful Knowledge
Unlawful knowledge includes:
-1- learning sorcery (dis: p3), since according to the most reliable position, it is unlawful, as the vast majority of scholars have decisively stated:
-2- philosophy (dis:w10);
-3- magic (Sha`badha, meaning sleight of hand, etc.);
-4- astrology (dis:p41);
-5- the sciences of the materialists (dis:w11).
-6- and anything that is a means to create doubts (n: in eternal truths), Such things vary in their degree of unlawfulness.
@A7.3: Offensive Knowledge
Offensive knowledge includes such things as post-classical poetry which contains romance and uselessness.
@A7.4: Permissible Knowledge
Permissible knowledge includes post-classical poetry which does not contain stupidity or anything that is offensive, incites to evil, hinders from good; not yet that which urges one to do good or helps one to do it (n: as the later would be recommended) (ibid., 1.27).
*1*BOOK B: THE VALIDITY OF FOLLOWING QUALIFIED SCHOLARSHIP
@CONTENTS:
Introduction b1.0
Meaning of Qualified Scholarship b1.2
The Koranic Evidence for Following Scholars b2.0
The Practice of the Prophetic Companions (Sahaba) b3.0
Religion Was Only Taken from Some Companions b3.2
Those Giving Opinions Did Not Mention Evidence b3.3
Prophet Dispatched Scholars to Various Peoples b3.4
Succeeding Generations Followed Companions Example b3.5
The Rational Evidence for Following Specialists b4.0
The Obligatoriness of Following Qualified Scholarship b5.0
Mujtahid's Opinion Is Evidence to Nonspecialists b5.1
Why Qualified Scholars Differ on Legal Questions b6.0
Probabalistic Versus Unquestionable Evidence b6.1
Example of a Question on which Scholars Differ b6.2
Scholarly Consensus (Ijma) b7.0
Meaning of Consensus b7.1
Scholarly Consensus Is Legally Binding b7.2
Koranic evidence b7.3
Hadith evidence b7.4
Scholarly Consensus and the Four Sunni Schools b7.5
Why one may not follow other than the four schools b7.6
*2*Chapter B1.0: Introduction
@B1.1
(Muhammad sa'id Buti:) What is the proof that it is legally valid and even obligatory to accept the authority of qualified scholarship (taq lid) when one is not capable of issuing expert legal opinion (ijtihad) on matters of Sacred Law? There are several aspects to it (n: discussed in the sections that follow) (al-Lammadhhabiyya akhtar bid a tuhaddidu al-sharia al-Islamiyya (y33), 70).
@B1.2: Meaning of Qualified Scholarship
(n:) For the key term qualified to issue expert legal opinion (Ar. mujtahid. this ability being ijtihad) please turn to book o and read o22.1(d) the qualifications of an Islamic judge (qadi). The difference between the qualifications for the Imam of a school and those for a judge or a mufti is that the former's comptence in giving opinion is absolute, extending to all subject matters in the Sacred Law, while the competence of the judge or mufti is limited respectively to judging court cases or to applying his Imam's ijtihad to particular questions.
No age of history is totally lacking people who are competent in ijtihad on particular questions which are new, and this is an important aspect of Sacred Law to provide solutions to new ethical problems by means of sound Islamic legal methodology in applying the Koranic and hadith primary texts. But while in this specific sense the door of ijtihad is not and cannot be closed, Islamic scholarship has not accepted anyone's claims to absolute ijtihad since Imams Abu Hanifa Malik, Shafi'i, and Ahmad. If one studies the intellectual legacy of these men underscholars who have a working familiarity with it, it is not difficult to see why.
As for those who decry "hidebound conservatism" and would open the gate of ijtihad for themselves while lacking or possibly not even knowing the necessary qualifications, if such people have not studied the rulings of a particular school and the relation between these rulings, the Koranic and hadith primary texts, and the school's methodological principles, they do not know how ijtihad works from an observer's standpoint, let alone how to employ it. To ask them for example which of two equally authenticated primary texts that conflict on a legal question should be given precedence, and why, is like asking an aspiring drafting student for the particulars of designing a suspension bridge. Answers may be forthcoming, but they will not be the same as those one could get from a qualified contractor. To urge that a mujtahid is not divinely protected from error (ma'sum) is as of little relevance to his work as the fact that a major physicist is not divinely protected from simple errors in calculus; the probability of finding them in his published work is virtually negligible. Regarding other, long-dead schools, such as the Zahiriyya, the difference between their work and that of the four living schools is firstly one of quality, as their positions and evidence have not been re-examined and upgraded by succeeding generations of first-rank scholars like those of the four schools (dis:w12), and secondly the lack of verification of the actual positions of their Mujtahid's through reliable chains of transmitters, as described below at b7.6.
*2*Chapter B2.0: The Koranic Evidence for Following Scholars
@B2.1
(Muhammad Sa'id Buti;) The first aspect of it is the word of Allah the Majestic.
"Ask those who recall if you know not" (Koran 16:43).
By consensus of all scholars (ijma.def:b7), this verse is an imperative for someone who does not know a ruling in Sacred Law or the evidence for it to follow someone who does. Virtually all scholars of fundamentals of Islamic law have made this verse their principle evidence that it is obligatory for the ordinary person to follow the scholar who is a mujtahid.
@B2.2
Similar to the above verse in being evidence for this is the word of Allah Most High:
"Not all of the believers should go to fight. Of every section of them, why does not one part alone go forth, that the rest may gain knowledge of the religion to admonish their people when they return, that happily they may take warning" (Koran 9:122).
Allah Most High prohibited the people to go out altogether in military expeditions and jihad and ordered a segment of them to engagse solely in becoming knowledgeable in the religion of Allah, so that when their brothers returned to them, they would find someone qualified to give them legal opinion on the lawful and unlawful and to explain the rule of Allah the Glorious and Exalted (ibid., 71).
*2*Chapter B3.0: The Practice of the Prophetic Companions (Sahaba)
@B3.1
(Muhammad Sa'id Buti:) A second aspect is the consensus of scholars that the Companions of the Prophet (Ar. Sahaba, anyone who personally met the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) and died while believing in Islam) were at various levels of knowledge in religion; not all of them were capable of giving formal legal opinion (fatwa), as Ibn Khaldun has noted, nor was the religion taken from all of them.
@B3.2: Religion Was Only Taken from Some Companions
Rather, there were those of them capable of legal opinion and ijtihad and these were a small minority in relation to the rest, and there were those of them who sought legal opinion and followed others therein, and these were the vast majority of them. (n: Suyuti, in Tadrib al-rawi, quotes Ibn Hazm's report that most of the Companions legal opinions came from only seven of them:'Umar, Ali, Ibn Mas'ud, Ibn Umar Ibn Abbas, Zayd ibn Thabit, and Aisha; and this was from thousands of the Companions (Tadrib al-rawi fi sharh Taqrib al-Nawawi(y109), 2,219). )
@B3.3: Those Giving Opinions Did Not Mention Evidence
Nor did the individual Companion giving a legal opinion necessarily mention the evidence for it to the person who had asked about it, Al-Amidi notes in his book al-lhkam: "As for scholarly consensus [ijma dis: b7.2] it is that ordinary people in the times of the Companions and those who immediately followed them, before there were dissenters, used to seek the opinion of mujtahids and would follow them in rules of Sacred Law.
"The learned among them would unhesitatingly answer their questions without alluding to mention of evidence. No one censured them for doing this; a fact that establishes scholarly consensus on the absolute permissibility of the ordinary person following one capable of ijtihad."
@B3.4: Prophet Dispatched Scholars to Various Peoples
The Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) used to dispatch the most knowledgeable of the Companions to places whose inhabitants knew nothing more of Islam than its five pillars. The latter would follow the person sent to them in everything he gave his judgment upon and had them do, of works, acts of worship, dealing with one another, and all matters of the lawful and unlawful.
Sometimes such a person would come across a question on which he could find no evidence in the Koran or sunna, and he would use his own personal legal reasoning and furnish them an answer in light of it, and they would follow him therein.
@B3.5: Succeeding Generations Followed Companions Example
As for the era of those who came after them (Ar. tabi'in, those who had personally learned from one or more of the Companions but not the Prophet himself (Allah bless him and give him peace) ), the scope f legal reasoning had expanded, and the Muslims of this time followed the same course as had the Companions of the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace), except that the legal efforts were represented by the two main schools of thought, that of juridical opinion (ra'y) and that of hadith (n: the former in iraq, the latter in Medina) because of the methodological factors we previously mentioned
when we quoted Ibn Khaldun.
There were sometimes discussions and sharp disputes between leading representatives of the two schools, but the ordinary people and learners not at the main figures' level of understanding were unconcerned with this disagreement, and followed whomever they wanted or whomever was near to them without anyone censuring them for this (al-Lamadhhabiyya akhtar bid'a tuhaddidu al-shari'a al-Islamiyya (y33), 71-73).
*2*Chapter B4.0: The Rational Evidence for Following Specialists
@B4.1
(Muhammad Sa'id Buti:) A third aspect is the obvious rational evidence, which we express in the words of Sheikh `Abdullah Diraz, who says: "The logical proof is that, assuming that a person does not have the qualifications for ijtihad, when an instance of a particular religious ruling arises, he will either not worship by any means at all, which all concur is impermissible, or, if he worships by means of something, it will either be by examining the proof that verifies the ruling or by following a competent authority.
"The former is inadmissible because it would lead, in respect to him and all others like him, to in-depth examination of the evidences for all such instances, preoccupation with which would obviate the earning of livelihoods, disrupting trades and occupations, running the world by neglect of tillage and offspring, and preventing any one's following another's ijtihad, placing everyone under the most extreme hardship. The sole remaining alternative is to follow another, which is the means through which one must worship in such a case" (ibid.,73).
*2*Chapter B5.0: The Obligatoriness of Following Qualified Scholarship
@B5.1: Mujtahid's Opinion Is Evidence to Nonspecialists
(Muhammad sa'id Buti:) Because scholars accept the evidence from Koran, sunna, and reason as complete and intersubstantiative that the ordinary person or learned one not at the level of textual deduction and ijtihad is not entitled but to follow a qualified mujtahid who has a comprehensive grasp of the evidence -they say that a formal legal opinion (fatwa) from a mujtahid is in relation to the ordinary person just as a proof from the Koran and sunna is in relation to the Mujtahid for the Koran just as it obligates the scholar throughly versed in it to hold to its evidences and proofs, also obligates (n:in the verse quoted above at b2.1) the uninformed person to adhere to the formal legal opinion of the scholar
and his ijtihad (ibid.,73).
*2*Chapter B6.0: Why Qualified Scholars Differ on Legal Questions
@B6.1: Mujtahid's Opinion Is Evidence to Nonspecialists
(Salih Mu'adhdhin:) Muslims of the Sunna and Community are in agreement that we have arrived at all the rulings of Sacred Law through evidence that is either of unquestionably established transmission (qat'i al-wurud) or probabilistically established transmission (zanni al-wurud). The suras of the Koran, all of its verses, and those hadiths which have reached us by so many channels of transmission that belief in them is obligatory (mutawatir,def:o22.1(d(II) ) ) are all of unquestionably established transmission, since they have reached us by numerous means, by generation from generation, whole groups, from whole groups such that it is impossible that the various channels could all have conspired to fabricate them.
As for the evidentiary character of these texts, regardless whether they are of unquestionably or probabilistically established transmission, they are of two types. The first type, unquestionable as evidence (qat'i al-dalala), is a plain text that does not admit of more than one meaning, which no mind can interpret beyond its one meaning, which no mind can interpret beyond its one meaning, and which there is no possibility to construe in terms of other than its apparent sense. This type includes Koranic verses that deal with fundamental tenets of faith in the oneness of Allah, the prayer, zakat, and fasting; in none of which is there any room for disagreement, nor have any differences concerning them been heard of or reported from the Imams of Sacred Law. Everything in this category is termed unquestionable as evidence.
The second type, probabilistic as evidence (zanni al-dalala), is a text that can bear more than one meaning, whether because it contains a word that can lexically have two different meanings, or because it was made by way of figure of speech or metaphor, or because it can be interpreted in other than its apparent sense in the context without this contradicting what was intended by the Wise Lawgiver. It is here that we find scope for scholarly difference of opinion to a greater or lesser extent depending on the number of meanings a text can imply, how much interpretation it will bear, and so forth.
All of the derivative rulings of Sacred Law are of this type, probabilistic as evidence, so we naturlly find differences among Islamic legal scholars as to their interpretation, each scholar interpreting them according to his comprehension and the broadness of his horizons, while not giving the text a reading it does not imply, and then corroborating his interpretation with evidence acceptable to scholars. Scholarly differences are thus something natural, even logically necessary, as a result of the factors we have just described.
Allah Mighty and Majestic has willed that most texts of the Sacred Law be probabilistic as evidence because of a wisdom He demands, namely, to give people more choice and leave room for minds to use ijtihad in understanding His word and that of His messenger (Allah bless him and give him peace).
@B6.2: Example of a Question on which Scholars Differ
We conclude this short summary with an example to clarify what we have said. Consider the word of Allah.
"Divorced women shall wait by themselves for three periods" (Koran 2:228).
as opposed to His saying, in the same sura,
"Those who forswear their women have a wait of four months"(Koran 2:226).
Allah's saying "three" in the former and "four" in the latter are texts that are decisive as evidence, in that neither admits of more than one interpretation, namely, the well-known numbers.
But in contrast with this, when Allah says "periods" (Ar.quru') in the first, and "months"(ashhur) in the second, we find that the former word can have more than one sense in its Arabic lexical root meaning, while months cannot, the latter being decisive in meaning and incapable of bearing another interpretation. Concerning this question, Imam Qurtubi says in his Koranic exegesis: "Scholars differ about the word periods. Those of kufa hold that it means menstrual periods, and this is the position of 'Umar, 'Ali, and Ibn Mas'ud. But those of the Hijaz hold it means the intervals of purity between menstrual periods, and this is the view of `A' isha, Ibn `Umar, and Shafi'i."
Considering this, is it not natural that there should be various opinions about understanding the verse "three periods" but only one about understanding Allah's saying "four months"? If Allah had wanted all opinions to coincide on this question. He might have said for example, "three menstrual periods" (hiyad) or
"three intervals of purity between menstrual periods" (athar), just as He said "four months." And all the texts of Sacred Law that can bear more than one meaning are comparable to this example ('Umdat al-salik (y90). 11-13).
*2*Chapter B7.0: Scholarly Consensus (Ijma`)
@B7.1: Meaning of Consensus
('Abdal-Wahhab Khallaf:) Scholarly consensus (ijma') is the agreement of all the mujtahids (def:o22.1(d) ) of the Muslims existing at one particular period after the Prophet's death (Allah bless him and give him peace) about a particular ruling regarding a matter or event. It may be gathered from this that the integral elements of scholarly consensus are four, without which it is invalid:
(a) that a number of mujtahids exist at a particular time:
(b) that all mujtahids of the Muslims in the period of the thing or event agree on its ruling, regardless of their country, race, or group, though nonmujtahids are of no consequence;
(c) that each mujtahid present his opinion about the matter in an explicit manner, whether verbally, by giving a formal legal opinion on it, or practically, by giving a legal decision in a court case concerning it;
(d) and that all mujtahids agree on the ruling, for if a majority of them agree, consensus is not effected, no matter how few those who contradict it, nor how many those who concur.
@B7.2: Scholarly Consensus Is Legally Binding
When the four necessary integrals of consensus exist, the ruling agreed upon is an authoritative part of Sacred Law that is obligatory to obey and not lawful to disobey. Nor can mujtahids of a succeeding era make the thing an object of new ijtihadm because the ruling on it, verified by scholarly consensus, is an absolute legal ruling which does not admit of being contravened or annulled.
@B7.3: Koranic evidence
The proof of the legal authority of scholarly consensus is that just as Allah Most Glorious has ordered the believers, in the Koran, to obey Him and His Messenger, so too He has ordered them to obey those of authority (ulu al-amr) among them, saying,
"O you who believe, obey Allah and obey the Prophet and those of authority among you" (koran 4:59).
such that when those of authority in legal expertise, the Mujtahids, agree upon a ruling, it is obligatory in the very words of the Koran to follow them and carry out their judgement.
And Allah threatens those who oppose the Messenger and follow other than the believers' way, saying,
"Whoever contraverts the Messenger after guidance has become clear to him and follows other than the believers' way, We shall give him over to what he has turned to and roast him in hell, and how evil an outcome" (Koran 4:115).
@B7.4: Hadith Evidence
A second evidentiary aspect is that a ruling agreed upon by all the mujtahids in the Islamic Community (Umma) is in fact the ruling of the Community, represented by its mujtahids, and there are many hadiths that have come from the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace), as well as quotes from the Companions, which indicate that the Community is divinely protected from error, including his saying (Allah bless him and give him peace) :
-1- "My Community shall not agree on an error."
-2- "Allah is not wont to make my Community concur on misguidance."
-3- "That which the Muslims consider good, Allah considers good." (`Ilm usul al-fiqh (y71), 45-47)
@B7.5: Scholarly Consensus and the Four Sunni Schools
(n: Another hadith that scholars quote in connection with the validity of scholarly consensus is the following, given with its commentary.)
The Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) said,
"Allah's hand is over the group, and whoever dissents from them departs to hell."
"Allah's hand is over the group, and whoever dissents from them departs to hell."
Allah's hand is over the group (al-`Azizi:) Munawi says, "Meaning His protection and preservation of them, signifying that the collectivity of the people of Islam are in Allah's fold, so be also in Allah's shelter, in the midst of them, and do not separate yourselves from them. "The rest of the hadith, accordng to the one who first recorded it (n: Tirmidhi), is, and whoever dissents from them departs to hell.
Meaning that whoever diverges from the overwhelming majority concerning what is lawful or unlawful and on which the Community does not differ has slipped off the path of guidance and this will lead him to hell (al-Siraj al-munir sharh al-Jami' al-saghir (y18), 3.449).
@B7.6: Why One May Not Follow Other Than the Four Schools
(n: In addition to its general interest as a formal legal opinion, the following serves in the present context to clarify why other than the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence do not necessarily play a role in scholarly consensus.) (`Abd al-Rahman Ba'alawi:) Ibn Salah reports that there is scholarly consensus on its being unlawful to follow rulings from schools other than those of the four Imams, meaning in one's personal works, let alone give court verdicts or formal legal opinions to people from the, because of the untrustworthiness of the ascription of such rulings to the scholars who reportedly gave them, there being no channels of transmission which obviate the possibility of textual corruption and spurious substitutions.
The Zaydis, for example, who trace themselves to Zayd ibn 'Ali Husayn (n:son of 'Ali and Fatima), the beatitude of Allah be upon them, despite the fact that Zayd was one of Imams of the religion and a renowned figure well qualified to give guidance to those seeking it, his followers identify him with extreme permissiveness on many questions, ascriptions based on failure to check as to what his positions actually were (n: by naming the intermediate transmitters and establishing their reliability). It is quite otherwise with the four schools, whose Imams (Allah reward them) have spent themselves in checking the positions of their schools, explaining what could be rigorously authenticated as the position of the person it was attributed to, and what could not be. Their scholars have thus achieved safety from textual corruption and have been able to discern the genuine from the poorly authenticated (Bughya al-mustarshidin fi talkhis fatawa ba'd al-a'imma min al-muta'akhkhirin (y19), 8).
*1*BOOK C: THE NATURE OF LEGAL RULINGS
@CONTENTS:
Kinds of Rulings cl.0
Meaning of a Legal Ruling c1.1
Injunctive Rulings c1.2
Stipulative Rulings c1.3
Types of Human Act c2.0
Obligatory c2.1
Recommended or Sunna c2.2
Permissible c2.3
Offensive c2.4
Unlawful c2.5
Minor sins c2.5(1)
Enormities c2.5(2)
Unbelief c2.5(3)
Ruling of an Act Varies with the Situation c2.6
Obligatory Acts c3.0
Time-Restricted Versus Non-Time-Restricted c3.1
Personally Obligatory Versus Communally Obligatory c3.2
Acts of Defined Amount Versus Undefined Amount c3.3
Specific Obligation Versus Alternatives c3.4
Recommended Acts c4.0
Confirmed Sunnas (Sunna Mu'akkada) c4.1
Supererogatory Works c4.2
Desirable Acts c4.3
Unlawful Acts c5.0
Unlawful in Itself Versus Extrinsically Unlawful c5.1
Dispensation (Rukhsa) and Strictness ('Azima) c6.0
Strictness c6.1
Dispensation c6.2
Interschool Differences Considered As Dispensations c6.3
Conditions for Following Another School c6.4
Way of Greater Precaution in Religion c6.5
Things One May Be Held Legally Responsible For c7.0
Conditions of a Valid Legal Responsibility c7.1
Legal Responsibility Lifted by Hardship c7.2
Who May Be Held Legally Responsible c8.0
Intellect and Puberty c8.1
Eligibility for Rights and Duties c8.2
Eligibility for Acts of Legal Consequence c8.3
Lack of eligibility c8.3(1)
Partial eligibility c8.3(2)
Full eligibility and events that modify it c8.3(3)
*2*Chapter C1.0: Kinds of Rulings
@C1.1: Meaning of a Legal Ruling
('Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf:) A legal ruling is a statement from the Lawgiver (syn. Allah or His messenger (Allah bless him and give him peace) ) concerning the acts of those morally responsible which:
-1- requires something;
-2- allows a choice;
-3- or gives stipulations.
@C1.2: Injunctive Rulings
An injunctive ruling is one that enjoins the morally responsible individual to either do or refrain from an act, or gives him an option to do or refrain from it.
An example of enjoining one to do an act is Allah's saying,
"People owe Allah to make pilgrimage to the House" (Koran 3:97).
An example of enjoining one to refrain from an act is His saying,
"Let no people mock another people" (Koran 49:11).
And an example of giving an option to do or refrain from an act is His saying,
"When the prayer is finished, go forth in the land" (Koran 62:10).
@C1.3: Stipulative Rulings
As for stipulatory rulings, they entail that something is made a legal reason (sabab) for another thing, a condition (shart) for it, or a preventive (mani) of it.
An example of being stipulated as reason for something is Allah's saying,
"O believers, when you go to pray, wash your faces and wash your forearms to the elbows" (Koran 5:6),
which stipulates wanting to pray as a reason for the obligation of performing ablution (wudu).
An example of something being made a condition for another thing is His saying.
"People owe Allah to make pilgrimage to the House, whoever is able to find a way" (Koran 3:97),
which implies that the ability to get to the House (n: Kaaba) is a condition for the obligatoriness of one's pilgrimage. Another example is the Prophet's saying (Allah bless him and give him peace),
"There is no marriage unless there are two witnesses,"
which means the presence of two witnesses is a condition for the validity of a marriage.
An example of being made a preventive of something is the Prophet's saying (Allah bless him and give him peace),
"The killer does not inherit,"
which entails that an heir's killing the deceased is preventive of his inheriting an estate division share from him ('Illm usul al-fiqh (y71), 100-102).
*2*Chapter C2.0: Types of Human Act
@C2.1: Obligatory
(N:) The obligatory (fard) is that which the Lawgiver strictly requires be done, Someone who performs an obligatory act out of obedience to Allah is rewarded, while a person who refrains from it without excuse deserves to be punished.
(A: In the Shafi'i school there is no difference between obligatory (fard) and requisite (wajib) except in the pilgrimage, where nonperformance of a requisite does not invalidate the pilgrimage, but necessitates an expiation by slaughtering. For any conditions necessary for its validity and all of its integrals (rukn, pl. arkan) are obligatory, since it is unlawful to intentionally perform an invalid act of worship.)
@C2.2: Recommended or Sunna
The sunna (n: or recommended (mandub) ) is that which the Lawgiver asks be done, but does not strictly require it. Someone who performs it out of obedience to Allah is rewarded, though someone who refrains from it is not punished.
@C2.3: Permissible
The permissible (mubah) is what the Lawgiver has neither requested nor prohibited, so the person who does it is not rewarded or punished. Rather, doing or not doing it are equal, though if a person does it to enable him to perform an act of obedience to Allah, or refrains from it for that reason, than he is rewarded for it. And if he does such an act to enable him to perform an act of disobedience, he is sinning.
@C2.4: Offensive
The offensive (makruh) is that which the Lawgiver has interdicted but not strictly forbidden. A person who refrains from such an act out of obedience to Allah is rewarded, while the person who commits it does not deserve to be punished.
@C2.5: Unlawful
The unlawful (haram) is what the Lawgiver strictly forbids. Someone who commits an unlawful act deserves punishment, while one who refrains from it out of obedience to the command of Allah is rewarded.
(n: Scholars distinguish between three levels of the unlawful:
-1- minor sins (saghira, pl. sagha'ir), which may be forgiven from prayer to prayer, from one Friday prayer (jumu'a) to another, and so forth, as in mentioned in hadith;
-2- enormities (kabira, pl. kaba'ir), those which appear by name in the Koran or hadith as the subject of an explicit threat, prescribed legal penalty, or curse, as listed below at book p;
-3- and unbelief (kufr), sins which put one beyond the pale of Islam (as discussed at o8.7) and necessitate stating the Testification of Faith (Shahada) to reenter it.
Repentance (def: p77) is obligatory for all three (al-Zawajir 'an iqtiraf al-kaba'ir (y49), 1.5-9). )
@C2.6: Ruling of an Act Varies with the Situation
(Nawawi:) There is no doubt that the merit of an act varies. Fasting, for example, is unlawful on 'Eid Day, obligatory before it, and recommended after it. The prayer is highly desirable most of the time, but offensive at some times and situations, such as when restraining oneself from using the lavatory. Reciting the Koran is desirable, but offensive when bowing in the desirable, but offensive when bowing in the prayer or prostrating. Dressing one's best is good on the 'Eid or on Friday, but not during the drought prayer. And so forth.
Abul Qasim al-Junayd (Allah have mercy on him) said, "A sincere person changes forty times a day, while the hypocritical show-off stays as he is forty years."
The meaning of this is that the sincere person moves with what is right, wherever it may lead, such that when prayer is deemed better by the Sacred Law, then he prays, and when it is best to be sitting with the learned, or the righteous, or guests, or his children, or taking care of something a Muslim needs, or mending a broken heart, or whatever else it may be, then he does it, leaving aside what he usually does. And likewise for fasting, reciting the Koran, invoking Allah, eating or drinking, being serious or joking, enjoying the good life or engaging in self-sacrifice, and so on. Whenever he sees what
is preferred by the Sacred Law under the circumstances, he does it, and is not bound by a particular habit or kind of devotion as the show-off is. The Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) did various things of prayer, fasting, sitting for Koran recital and invocation, eating and drinking, dressing, riding, lovemaking with his wives, seriousness and jest, happiness and wrath, scathing condemnation for blameworthy things, leniency in punishing those who deserved it and excusing them, and so on, according to what was possible and preferable for the time and circumstances (al-Majmu' (y108), 1.17-18).
*2*Chapter C3.0: Obligatory Acts
@C3.1: Time-Restricted Versus Non-Time-Restricted
('Abd al-Wahhab khallaf:) Obligatory acts are distinguished in four ways, according to various considerations.
One distinction is whether current performance is time-restricted or non-time-restricted.
A time-restricted obligatory act is one the Lawgiver demands be done at a particular time, such as the five obligatory prayers, for each of which the time for current performance is set, such that the particular prayer is not obligatory before it, and the individual is guilty of serious sin if he delays it past its time without excuse.
A non-time-restricted obligatory act is one which the Lawgiver strictly demands, but does not specify a time for its current performance, such as the expiation obligatory for someone who swears and oath and breaks it (def: 020).
@C3.2: Personally Obligatory Versus Communally Obligatory
A second distinction between obligatory acts is made on the basis of who is called upon to perform them, namely whether an act is personally obligatory or communally obligatory.
A personally obligatory (fard al-'ayn) act is what the Lawgiver requires from each and every morally responsible person. It is insufficient for someone to perform such an act on another's behalf, such as the prayer, zakat (def: h1.0), pilgrimage, keeping agreements, and avoiding wine or gambling.
A communally obligatory (fard al-kifaya) act is what the Lawgiver requires from the collectivity of those morally responsible, not from each one of them, such that if someone undertakes it, then the obligation has been fulfilled and the sin and responsibility (n: of nonperformance) is lifted from the rest, while if no one undertakes it, then all are guilty of serious sin for neglecting the obligation, Examples include commanding the right and forbidding the wrong (def: book q), praying over the dead, building hospitals, lifesaving, fire fighting, medicine, industries people require, the existence of Islamic courts and judges, issuing formal legal opinions, responding to someone who says "as-Salam 'alaykum," and testifying in court. The Lawgiver requires that these obligatory acts exist in the Islamic Community regardless of who does them. But He does not require they be done by each person, or some particular one, since the interests of the Community are realized by the existence of these things through the efforts of some of those morally responsible, and do not entail every particular person's performance of them.
Someone able through himself or his property to perform the communally obligatory act is obliged to perform it, and someone unable to do it himself is obliged to urge and have the person do it who can. If the obligatory act is done, all are cleared of the sin, and if neglected all the guilty of serious sin. The person capable of it is guilty because he neglected a communally obligatory act he could have done, and the rest are guilty because they neglected to urge him and have him perform the obligatory act he was capable of.
When an individual is the only one available who can perform a communally obligatory act, it becomes personally obligatory for him.
@C3.3: Acts of Defined Amount Versus Undefined Amount
A third way Obligatory acts are distinguished is by the amount of them required, that is, whether the act is of a defined amount or an undefined amount.
Obligatory acts of defined amount are those for which the Lawgiver has determined a particular quantity, such that the subject is not free of the obligation until he has done the amount stipulated by the Lawgiver, as with the five obligatory payers, or zakat.
Obligatory acts of undefined amount are those which the Lawgiver has not stipulated the amount of, but rather demands them from the subject in an undetermined quantity, such as spending in the way of Allah, cooperating with one another in good works, feeding the hungry, helping those in distress, and so forth.
@C3.4: Specific Obligation Versus Alternatives
A fourth distinction between obligatory acts is whether an act is a specific obligation, or an obligation to choose between certain alternatives.
Specific obligations are those in which the Lawgiver demands the act itself, such as the prayer, fasting in Ramadan, paying for merchandise, rent from a tenant, or returning something wrongfully taken; such that the individual is not free of the obligation until he does that very act.
An obligation to choose between certain alternatives is when the Lawgiver requires the performance of one of a given number of actions, such as one of the options in expiating a broken oath, where Allah Most High requires the person who has broken his oath to feed ten poor people, clothe them, or free a slave ('abd,def:w13), and the obligation consists of doing any of these three things ('Ilm usul al-fiqh (y71), 106, 108-11).
*2*Chapter C4.0: Recommended Acts
@C4.1: Confirmed Sunnas (Sunna Mu'akkada)
(`Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf:) Recommended acts are divided into three categories.
@C4.2: Supererogatory Works
The first is recommended acts whose demand is confirmed. Someone who neglects such an act does not deserve punishment, but does deserve censure and blame. This includes the sunnas and recommended acts that are legally considered to complete obligatory acts, such as the call to prayer (adhan) or performing the obligatory prayers,in a group, as well as all religious matters that the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) diligently performed and did not omit except once or twice to show that they were not obligatory, like rinsing out the mouth when performing ablution, or reciting a sura or some verses of the Koran after the Fatiha during the prayer. This category is called the confirmed sunna (sunna mu akkada) or sunna of guidance.
@C4.3: Desirable Acts
The second category is those acts whose performance is sanctioned by sacred Law such that the person who performs them is rewarded, though someone who omits them deserves neither punishment nor blame. This includes acts the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) did not diligently perform, but did one or more times and then discontinued. It also includes all voluntary acts, like spending on the poor, fasting on Thursday of each week, or praying rak'as (units) of prayer in addition to the obligatory and confirmed sunna prayers.
This category is called the extra sunna or supererogatory (nafila).
@C4.4: Superlatively Recommended Acts
The third category consists of the superlatively recommended, meaning those acts considered part of an individual's perfections. It includes following the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) in ordinary matters that proceeded from him as a human being, as when a person eats, drinks, walks, sleeps, and dresses like the Prophet used to. Following the example of the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) in these and similar matters is an excellence and considered among one's refinements, as it shows one's love for the Prophet and great attachment to him. But someone who does not follow the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) in matters like these is not considered a wrongdoer, because they are not part of his lawgiving (A: though such acts are rewarded when one thereby intends to follow the prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace), and every desirable practice one performs means a higher degree in paradise which the person who neglects it may not attain to).
Acts of this category are called desirable (mustahabb), decorum (adab), or meritorious (ibid., 112).
*2*Chapter C5.0: Unlawful Acts
@C5.1: Unlawful in Itself Versus Extrinsically Unlawful
(`Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf:) The unlawful is of two kinds. The first is the originally unlawful in itself, meaning the Sacred Law forbids it from the outset, such as adultery, theft, prayer without ritual purity, marrying a member of one's unmarriageable kin while knowing them to be such, selling unslaughtered dead animals, and so forth, of things that are intrinsicallu unlawful because they entail damage and harm, the prohibition applying from the outset to the very act.
The second is the unlawful because of an extrinsic reason, meaning that the initial ruling of an act was that it was obligatory, recommended, or permissible, but an extrinsic circumstance became linked with it that made it unlawful, such as a prayer performed in a garment wrongly taken, or a sale in which there is fraud, or a marriage whose sole purpose is to allow the woman to remarry her previous husband who has pronounced a threefold divorce against her, or fasting day after day without breaking the fast at night, or an unlawfully innovated divorce (def:n2.3), and so forth, of things unlawful because of an external circumstance. The prohibition is not due to the act itself. But because of something extrinsic to the act; meaning the act is not damaging or harmful in itself, but something has happened to it and become conjoined with it that makes it entail damage or harm.
@C5.2
One consequence of the above distinction is that an intrinsically unlawful act is uncountenanced by the Law to begin with, so it cannot be a legal cause or reason, or form the basis for further legal cosequences, Rather, it is invalid, Because of this, prayer without ritual purity is invalid, marriage to a close unmarriageable relative when one knows them to be such is invalid, and the sale of an unslaughtered dead animal is invalid. And something legally invalid is without other legal efficacy.
But an act that is unlawful because of an extrinsic circumstance is intrinsically lawful, and can thus be a legal reason and form the basis for further legal consequences, since its prohibition is accidental to it and not essential. Because of this a prayer while wearing a garment wrongfully taken is legally valid, though the person is guilty of serious sin for having taken it; a sale in which there is fraud is legally valid (N: though the buyer has the option to cancel the sale and return the merchandise for a full refund); and an unlawfully innovated divorce is legally effective.
The reason for this is that the prohibition of an act because of an extrinsic event or circumstance does not vitiate either the basis of its being a legal cause or its identity, provided all its integrals and conditions exist. As for intrinsic unlawfulness, it negates the basis of an act's being a legal cause and vitiates its identity by the nonexistence of one of its integrals or conditions, so that it is no longer something that is of legal consideration (ibid., 113-14).
*2*Chapter C6.0: Dispensation (Rukhsa) and Strictness ('Azima)
@C6.1: Strictness
(`Abd al-Wahhab khallaf:) Strictness is what Allah initially legislates, of general rulings not concerned with one circumstance rather than another, or one individual rather than another.
@C6.2: Dispensation
Dispensation is when what is normally forbidden is made permissible because of neccessity or need.
For example, if someone is forced to make a statement of unbelief (kufr) it is made permissible, to ease his hardship, for him to do so as long as faith remains firm in his heart. Likewise with someone who is forced to break his fast in Ramadan, or forced to destroy the property of another; the normally prohibited act which he is forced to do becomes permissible for him, to ease the hardship. And it is made permissible for someone forced by extreme hunger or severe thirst to eat from an unslaughtered dead animal or drink wine. (A: The latter is not permissible even under such conditions in the Shafi'i
school) Dispensation also includes being permitted to omit an obligatory act when an excuse exists that makes its performance a hardship (dis: c7.2. second par.) upon the individual. Thus, someone who is ill or travelling in Ramadan is permitted not to fast. And someone who is travelling is permitted to shorten prayers of four rak'as to only two rak'as (ibid., 121-22).
@C6.3: Interschool Differences Considered As Dispensations
(n:) Since it is permissible for a Muslim to follow any of the four Imams in any of his acts of worship, comparison of their differences opens another context from discussing dispensation and strictness, a context in which classical scholars familiar with various schools often use the term "dispensation " to refer to the ruling of the school easiest on a particular legal question, and "strictness" to refer to the ruling of the school that is most rigorous. Which school this is varies from question to question. The following entry discusses how and when it is permissible for ordinary Muslims to use dispensation in the sense of following easier rulings from a different school, while entry c6.5 discusses the way of greater precaution (al-ahwat fi al-din) taken by those Muslims who purposely select the strictest school of thought on each legal question because of its being more precautionary and closer to godfearingness (taqwa).
@C6.4: Conditions for Following Another School
Scholars frequently acknowledge that the difference of the Imams is a mercy, and their unanimity is a decisive proof, Sheikh `Umar Barakat, the commentator of 'Umdat al-salik, says:
"It is permissible to follow each of the four Imams (Allah be well pleased with them), and permissible for anyone to follow one of them on a legal question, and follow a different one on another legal question. It is not obligatory to follow one particular Imam on all legal questions" (Fayd al-llah al-Malik (y27), 1.357).
This does not, however, imply that it is lawful to indiscriminately choose dispensations from each school, or that there are no conditions for the above mentioned permissibility. Imam Nawawi was asked for a formal legal opinion on whether pursuing dispensations in such a manner was permissible;
(Question:) "Is it permissible for someone of a particular school to follow a different school in matters that will be of benefit to him, and to seek out dispensations?"
He answered (Allah be well pleased with him), "It is not permissible to seek out dispensations [A: meaning it is unlawful, and the person who does is corrupt (fasiq) ], and Allah knows best" (Fatawa al-Imam al-Nawawi (y105), 113).
But when forced by necessity or hardship to take such a dispensation (A: even retroactively as when one has finished the action, and then makes the intention to have followed another Imam's school of thought on the question), then there is nothing objectionable in it, provided that one's act of worship together with its prerequisites is valid in at least one of the schools. One may not simply piece together (taliq) constituent parts from various schools in a single act of worship, if none of the schools would consider the act valid. An example is someone who performs an ablution that is minimally valid in the Shafi'i school by wetting only a few hairs of his head in the ablution sequence, something not permitted by Hanafis, and then prays behind an imam without himself reciting the Fatiha, something permitted by Hanafis but not shafiis. His ablution, the necessary condition for his prayer is inadequate in the Hanafi school and his performance of the prayer is inadequate school, with the result that neither considers his prayer valid, and in fact it is not, Whoever follows a ruling mentioned in this volume from another school must observe the conditions given at w14 and make sure his worship is valid in at least one school, which for prayer can best be achieved by performing all recommended measures in the present volume relating to purity, for example, e5,e11, and so on, as if obligatory.
@C6.5: Way of Greater Precaution in Religion
A second way to use differences between schools is to take the way of greater precaution by following whoever is most rigorous on a given question. For example, when performing the purificatory bath (ghusl), rinsing the mouth and nostrils with water is a nonobligatory, sunna measure according to the Shafi'i school, but obligatory and necessary for the purificatory bath's validity according to Hanafis.
The way of greater precaution is for the Shafi'i to perform it as diligently as if it were obligatory, even though omitting it is permitted by his school. (`Abd al-Wahhab Sha'rani:) My brother, when you first hear of the two levels of this scale (n: dispensation and strictness), beware of jumping to the conclusion that there is absolute free choice between them, such that an individual may without restriction choose either dispensation or strictness in any ruling he wishes. It does not befit a person able to perform the stricter ruling to stoop to taking a dispensation permissible to him. (A: The more rigorous is always preferable in the Shafi'i school even when the dispensation is permissible.) For as you know my brother, I do not say that the individual is free to choose between taking the dispensation or taking the stricter ruling when he is able to perform the stricter ruling obligatory for him. I take refuge in Allah from saying such a thing, which is like making a game of religion. Of an absolute certainty, dispensation are only ofr someone unable to perform the stricter ruling, for in such a case, the dispensation is the stricter ruling in relation to him.
Moreover, I hold that mere sincerely and honesty demand of anyone who follows a particular school not to take a dispensation that the Imam of his school holds is permissible unless he is someone who needs to; and that he must follow the stricter ruling of a different Imam when able to, since rulings fundamentally refer back to the word of the Lawgiver, no one else; this being especially necessary when the other Imam's evidence is stronger, as opposed to what some followers do.
We find among the dictums of the Sufis that one should not follows a position in Sacred Law for which the evidence is weaker except when religiously more precautionary than the stronger position.
For example, the Shafi'i opinion that (n:a male's) ablution is nullified by touching a girl who is a child or touching the nails or hair of a woman: though this position is considered weaker by them (n: than the position given at e7.3), it is religiously more precautionary, so performing ablution for the above-mentioned things is better (al-Mizan al-kubra (y1230,:10-11).
(A Because more rigorous rulings necessarily meet the requirements of less rigorous ones (though not vice versa), following more rigorous rulings from another school is unconditionally valied, unlike following its dispensations. And Allah knows best.)
*2*Chapter C7.0: Things One May Be Held Legally Responsible For
@C7.1: Conditions of a Valid Legal Responsibility
('Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf:) Three conditions must exist in any act that it is legally valid to make an individual responsible for. The first is that the act be well enough known to the individual that he can perform it in the way required of him. It should be noted that the individual's knowledge of what he is responsible for means the possibility of his knowing it, not his actual knowledge of it. Whenever a person reaches puberty, of sound mind and capable of knowing the rulings of Sacred Law by himself or by asking those familiar with them, then he is considered to know what he is responsible for, and rulings are carried out on him, their consequences exacted of him, and the excuse of being ignorant of them is not accepted from him.
The second condition is that it is known that the ruling has been imposed by someone who possesses the authority to do so and whose rules the individual is obliged to observe, since it is through this knowledge that the individual's will can be directed to obey him. This is the reason that in any proof for a ruling of Sacred Law the first point discussed is why it is legally binding for individuals.
The third condition is that the act the subject is responsible for be possible and within the capacity of the subject to do or to refrain from. This condition in turn implies two things: first, that it is legally invalid to impose something impossible, whether impossible in itself or impossible because of another thing; and second, that it is invalid to ask that a particular individual be responsible for someone else's performing an act or refraining from one, since someone else's action or inaction is not within the individual's own capacity. Hence, a person is not responsible for his father's paying zakat, his brother's performing the prayer, or his neighbor's refraining from theft. As regards others, all a person is obliged to do is to advise, to command the right and forbid the wrong, for these are acts he is capable of.
Nor is it legally valid to make a person responsible for various innate human states which are the results of natural causes that are not of the person's acquisition or choice, such as emotional arousal when angry; turning red when embarassed; love, hate, grief, elation, or fear when reasons them exist; digestion; breathing; being short or tall, black or white; and other innate traits with which people are born and whose presence or absence is subject to natural laws, not to the individual's will and choice, and which are thus beyond his capacity and not among the things possible for him. And if some primary texts have reached us that apparently show that there is responsibility for some of the things that are not within a person's capacity, these are not as they seem. For example, the order of the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace),
"Do not become angry,"
is outwardly an order to refrain from something natural and unacquired, namely, anger when motives for it exist. But the real meaning is "Control yourself when angry and restrain yourself from its bad consequences."
@C7.2: Legal Responsibility Lifted by Hardship
From the condition that an act must be within the individual's capacity before he can be held accountable for it, one should not jump to the conclusion that this implies there will not be any hardship whatsoever for the individual in the act. There is no contradiction between an act's being within one's capacity and its being hard. Nothing a person is responsible for is completely free of hardship, since moral responsibility is being obliged to do that in which there is something to bear with, and some type of difficulty.
Hardship, however, is of two types. The first is that which people are accustomed to bear, which is within the limits of their strength, and were they to continue bearing it, it would not cause them harm or damage to their persons, possessions, or other concerns. The second is that which is beyond what people are accustomed to bear and impossible for them to continually endure because they would be cut off, unable to go on, and damage and harm would affect their persons, possessions, or one of their other concerns. Examples include fasting day after day without breaking it at night, a monastic life, fasting while standing in the sun, or making the pilgrimage on foot. It is a sin for someone to refuse to take a dispensation and insist on the stricter ruling when this will probably entail harm (`Ilm usul al-fiqh (y71), 128-33).
*2*Chapter C8.0: Who May Be Held Legally Responsible
@C8.1: Intellect and Puberty
(`Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf:) Two conditions must exist in an individual for it to be legallly valid to hold him responsible.
The first condition is that he is able to understand the evidence that he is responsible for something, such that it is within his capacity to understand legal texts from the Koran and sunna by which the ruling is imposed, whether by himself of through another (dis: b5.1). Since human reason is something hidden, unobservable by outward sense perception, the Lawgiver has conjoined responsibility for rulings with something manifest and perceptible to the senses from which reason may be inferred, namely, puberty.
Whoever reaches puberty without showing signs of impaired intellectual faculties, his capacity for responsibility exists. And conversely, neither an insane person nor child are responsible, because of their lack of intellect, which is the means of understanding the evidence that something is a ruling. Nor are those responsible who are in a state of absentmindedness or sleeping, because while they are heedless or asleep it is not within their capacity to understand. The Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace) said,
"The pen has been lifted from three: the sleeper until he awakens, the child until his first wet dream, and the insane person until he can reason."
The second condition (n:for the legal validity of holding someone responsible) is that he be legally eligible for the ruling. Eligibility is of two types, eligibility for obligation, and eligibility for performance.
@C8.2: Eligibility for Rights and Duties
Eligibility for obligation is the capacity of a human being to have rights and duties. This eligibility is established for every person by the mere fact of being human, whether male, female,fetus, child, of the age of discrimination, adolescent, intelligent, foolish, sane or insane, healthy or ill; because its basis is an innate attribute found in man. Every human being, whoever he or she may be, has eligibility for obligation and none lacks it because one's eligibility for obligation is one's humanness.
There are only two human states in relation to eligibility for obligation, partial and full. One could have partial eligibility for obligation by being entitled to possess rights over others but not have obligations towards them, like a fetus in its mother's womb, which has rights, since it can be an heir, inherit a bequest, and the proceeds of an endowment (waqf) can accrue to it, but it does not have any obligations to others. Full eligibility for obligation means a person has rights upon others and
obligations towards them. Every human being acquires it at birth.
@C8.3: Eligibility for Acts of Legal Consequence
Eligibility for performance is the capacity of an individual for words and actions that are legally significant, such that if an agreement or act proceeds from him, it legally counts and entails the rulings applicable to it. If he prays, fasts, makes the pilgrimage, or does anything obligatory; it is legally acknowleged and discharges the obligation. And if he commits a crime against another's person, possessions, or honor, he is held accountable for his crime and is bodily or financially penalized.
So eligibility for performance is responsibility, and its basis in man is intellectual discrimination.
There are three states which a person may have in relation to eligibility for performance:
-1- A person could completely lack or lose eligibility for performance, like a young child during his childhood or an insane person during his insanity (regardless of his age), neither of whom has eligibility for performance because they lack human reason, and for neither of whom are there legal consequences entailed by their words or actions. Their agreements and legal dispositions are null and void, the limit of which is that if either of them commits a crime against another's person or possessions, he is responsible for paying the indemnity out of his own property, but not subject to retaliation in his own person. This is the meaning of the scholars' expression, "The intentional act of a child or insane person is an honest mistake."
-2- A person could have partial eligibility for performance, an example of which is the child who has reached the age of mental discrimination (def: f1.2) but not puberty (k13.8), or the retarded person, who is not disturbed in intellect nor totally bereft of it, but rather is weak-minded and lacking in intellect, so that the Sacred Law treats him as it does the child with discrimination. Because each of these two possesses the basis of eligibility for performance by the fact of having discrimination, those of their legal actions which are absolutely beneficial to them, such as accepting gifts or alms, are valid without their guardian's permission.
As for those of their legal actions which are wholly harmful to them, such as giving donations or waiving their rights to something, these are not in any way valid, even with the guardian's permission.
The gift, bequest, endowment, and divorce of such persons are not valid, and the guardian's permission is irrelevant to these actions. The legal actions of the child with discrimination or the retarded person which are between absolute benefit and absolute harm to him are valid, but only on condition that the guardian gives his permission for them. If the guardian gives permission for the agreement or disposition, it is implemented, and if he does not permit it, the action is invalid.
-3- Or a person could have full eligibility for performance by the fact of having reached puberty sound of mind.
Events, however, may befall this eligibility. They include those that happen to a person without affecting his eligibility for performance by eliminating or diminishing it, but which alter some rulings concerning him because of considerations and interests that arise through these events, not because of loss or lessening of eligibility for performance. Examples include the foolhardy and the absentminded person. Both have reached puberty with normal intelligence and have full eligibility for performance, but to protect their own property from loss and prevent them from becoming a financial burden on others, they are declared legally incompetent in financial dealings such that neither their financial transactions nor donations are valid. This is not because of a lack or lessening of their eligibility for performance, but rather to protect their own property. A debtor has likewise reached puberty with normal intelligence and possessess full eligibility for performance, but to protect the rights of his creditors, he is declared legally incompetent to make transactions with his money that infringe on the rights of his creditors, such as charitable donations (`Ilm usul al-fiqh (y71) 134-40).
*1*BOOK D: AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO `UMDAT AL-SALIK
@CONTENTS:
Introduction d1.0
A Description of the Book d1.2
The Title d1.3
*2*Chapter D1.0: Author's Introduction
@D1.1
In the name of Allah, Most Merciful and Compassionate.
Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds. Allah bless our liegelord Muhammad, his folk, and his Companions one and all.
@D1.2: A Description of the Book
This is a summary of the school of Imam Shafi'i (the mercy and bliss of Allah Most High be upon him) in which I have confined myself to the most dependable positions (al-sahih) of the school according to Imam Rafi'i and Imam Nawawi, or according to just one of them. I may mention a difference of opinion herein, this being when their recensions contend (dis: w12), giving Nawawi's position first (0: as he is the foremost reference of the school), and then as opposed to it, that of Rafi'i (n:generally left untranslated because it is the weaker position where mentioned).
@D1.3: The Title
I have named it The Reliance of the Traveller and Tools of the Worshipper.
(O: Reliance means that which is depended upon, since the author meant that this text should be a reliable resource work for whoever goes by it, because it contains the most dependable positions of the school and omits the weak ones.
Traveller (salik) derives from travel (suluk), meaning to proceed along, the allusion being to the spiritual journey, meaning one's seeking knowledge of the rules of religion with seriousness and effort, to thereby reach Allah Most High and be saved from perdition.
Tools are physical instruments their owner depends on in his work, like those of a carpenter. The tools here are knowledge of the rules of Sacred Law found in this text which the validity of worship depends upon.)
@D1.4
I ask Allah to give benefit through it, and He is my sufficiency, and best to rely on.
*1*BOOK E: PURIFICATION
@CONTENTS:
Water e1.0
Legal Categories of Water e1.1
Purifying e1.2
Pure e1.3
Impure e1.4
Only Plain Water Is Purifying e1.5
Used or Changed Water Is Not purifying e1.7
Slight Change Does Not Affect Water e1.8
Water Is Affected by User's Contact e1.9
216 or More Liters of Water (Qullatayn) e1.11
216 Liters Remains Purifying Even After Use e1.11
216 Liters Becomes Impure by Change from Impurities e1.12
216 Liters Becomes Pure If the Change Disappears e1.13
Contact with Filth Makes Under 216 liters Impure e1.15
Reaching 216 Liters Purifies Less Than 216 Liters e1.16
Meaning of Change in Water e1.17
Containers and Utensils e2.0
Unlawfulness of Gold or Silver Vessels and Utensils e2.1
Vessels soldered or decorated with gold or silver e2.2
Using a Toothstick (Siwak) e3.0
Times of Use e3.1
Acceptable Types e3.3
Directions for Use e3.4
The Body e4.0
Sunnas of the Body e4..1
Mustache and beard e4.1(2)
Preferring imitation of non-Muslims to the sunna e4.1(2)
Cutting the Hair e4.2
Circumcision Is Obligatory e4.3
Dyeing Hair, Etc. e4.4
Ablution (Wudu) e5.0
The Six Obligatory Integrals of Ablution e5.1
The Intention e5.2
What one intends e5.2
Intention of Those Incapable of Normal Abultion e5.3
Conditions for the Intention of Ablution e5.4
How to perform Ablution e5.5
The Basmala and Pre-Abultion Supplications e5.5
Washing the Hands e5.6
Cleaning the teeth, rinsing out nose and mouth e5.7
Washing the Face e5.8
Beard and facial hair e5.9
Washing the Arms e5.10
Wiping the Head e5.11
Wiping the ears e5.12
Washing the Feet e5.13
Doubts about Washing a Limb Three Times e5.14
Beginning with the Right, Etc. e5.15
Washing More Than the Obligatory Area e5.16
Washing Without Pause Between Successive Limbs e5.17
Supplication After Ablution e5.18
Other Recommended Measures e5.19
Things Offensive in Ablution e5.24
Minimal Amounts of Water for Ablution and Bathing e5.25
Water-Repellent Substances Prevent Ablution e5.26
Doubts About Having Washed a Part in Ablution e5.27
Renewing Ablution When not Obligatory e5.28
Ablution Recommended After Making Love e5.29
Wiping Footgear e6.0
Duration of Periods of Permissibility e6.1
Major Ritual Impurity (Janaba) During the Period e6.3
Conditions for Permissibility of Wiping Footgear e6.4
How to Wipe Footgear e6.6
When Foot Shows e6.7
The Four Causes of Minor Ritual Impurity (Hadath) e7.0
Anything That Exits from Private Parts e7.1
Loss of Intellect Through Sleep, Etc. e7.2
Sleep while seated e7.2
Contact of Man and Woman's Skin e7.3
Touching Human Private Parts with Hand e7.4
Meaning of hand e7.4
Things That Do Not Nullify Ablution e7.5
Doubts About Whether Ablution Has Been Nullified e7.6
Actions Unlawful During Minor Ritual Impurity (Hadath) e8.0
Touching the Koran Is Unlawful Without Ablution e8.1 (5)
Carrying the Koran, Etc. 38.2
Going to the Lavatory e9.0
Recommended Measures e9.1
Prohibitions e9.2
The Obligation of Cleaning Oneself of Filth e9.3
Use of dry substances or water e9.4
How to clean oneself e9.5
Cleaning before or after ablution e9.6
Major Ritual Impurity (Janaba) e10.0
Causes c10.1
Meaning of Sperm and Female Sexual Fluid e10.4
Things Not considered Sperm e10.5
Doubts About Whether Discharge Is Sperm e10.6
Actions Unlawful on Major Ritual Impurity (Janaba) e10.7
How to Perform the Purificatory Bath (Ghusl) e11.0
Steps e11.1
Obligatory Features e11.1(a)
Nullifying Ablution (Wudu) Before Finishing Bath e11.2
Removing Filth from Body before Bathing e11.3
Performing Bath for Two Reasons at Once e11.4
Times When Purificatory Bath Is Sunna e11.5
Dry Ablution (Tayammum) e12.0
Conditions for Validity e12.1
Takes the Place of Ablution Until Nullified e12.1(3)
Takes the Place of Bath (Ghusl) Until Water Is Found e12.1(3)
The Three Causes of Inability to Use Water e12.2
Lack of Water e12.3
Certainty of getting water at end of prayer time e12.4
Buying water e12.6
Only enough water for partial ablution or bath e12.7
Fear of Thirst e12.8
Illness e12.9
Meaning of illness e12.9
Ablution on a cast or bandage e12.10
Fear of illness from extreme cold e12.14
Ablution When Lacking Both Water and Earth e12.15
Obligatory Integrals of Dry Ablution e12.16
Sunnas of Dry Ablution e12.17
How to wipe arms e12.17(4)
Things Which Nullify Dry Ablution e12.19
Each Dry Ablution Permits Only One Obligatory Prayer e12.20
The Menstrual Period e13.0
Minimal and Maximal Duration e13.1
Dusky-Colored Discharge, Intermittence, Etc. e13.4
Postnatal Bleeding (Nifas) e13.3
Actions Unlawful During Menstruation e13.4
Women with Chronic Vaginal Discharge e13.6
People with Chronic Annulment of Ablution e13.7
Filth (Najasa) e14.0
Things That Are Filth e14.1
Alcohol used in cosmetics, surgery, etc. e14.1(7)
Non-meat products of an unslaughtered animal e14.1(14)
Rennet in Cheese-Making e14.2
Some Pure Substances e14.5
Forms of Filth That Can Become Pure e14.6
Wine becoming vinegar e14.6
Tanning an unslaughtered hide e14.6
New life growing out of filth e14.6
Chemical change into a new substance e14.6(n:)
Purifying Something After Contact with Dogs or Swine e14.7
Meaning of contact e14.7
Purity of dogs in Maliki school e14.7(n:)
Washing Away Filth e14.10
Discernible Versus Indiscernible Filth e14.10
Water Must Flow When Washing with Under 216 Liters e14.11
Filth on Floor or Carpet e14.12
Liquids Affected with Filth e14.13
Whether Water That Washes Filth Is Pure or Impure e14.14
A Garment Damp with Filth Touching a Dry One e14.15
*2*Chapter E1.0: Water
@E1.1: Legal Categories of Water
Water is of various types:
-1- purifying;
-2- pure;
-3- and impure.
@E1.2: Purifying
Purifying means it is pure in itself and it purifies other things.
(O: Purification (Ar. tahara) in Sacred Law is lifting a state of ritual impurity (hadath, def:e7), removing filth (najasa, e14), or matters similar to these, such as purificatory baths (ghusl) that are merely sunna or renewing ablution (wudu) when there has been no intervening ritual impurity.)
@E1.3: Pure
Pure means it is pure in itself but cannot purify other things (O: such as water that has already been used to lift a state of ritual impurity).
@E1.4: Impure
Impure means it is neither purifying nor pure. (O: Namely:
-1- less than 216 liters of water (qullatayn) which is contaminated by filth (najasa), even when none of the water's characteristics (n: i.e. taste, color, or odor) have changed.
-2- or 216 liters or more of water when one of its characteristics of taste, color, or odor have changed (n:through the effect of the filth. As for the purity of water that has been used to wash away filth, it is discussed below at e14.14). )
@E1.5: Only Plain Water Is Purifying
It is not permissible (O: or valid) to lift a state of ritual impurity or remove filth except with plain water (O: not used water (def:(2) below), or something other than water like vinegar or milk), meaning purifying water as it comes from nature, no matter what quality it may have (O: of taste. such as being fresh or saline (N: including seawater); of color, such as being white, black, or red; or of odor, such as having a pleasant smell).
@E1.7: Used or Changed Water Is Not purifying
It is not permissible to purify (def: e1.2(O:) ) with:
-1- water that has changed so much that it is no longer termed water through admixture with something pure like flour or saffron which could have been avoided;
-2- less than 216 liters of water that has already been used for the obligation (dis:c2.1(A:), end) of lifting a state of ritual impurity, even if only that of a child;
-3- or less that 216 liters of water that has been used to remove filth, even if this resulted in no change in the water.
@E1.8: Slight Change Does Not Affect Water
It is permissible to purify with water:
-1- (non-(1) above) that has been only slightly changed by saffron or the like;
-2- that has been changed by proximity with something such as aloes or oil that are (O: i.e. even if) fragrant;
-3- that has been changed by something impossible to prevent, such as algae, tree leaves falling in it, dust, or the effects of standing too long;
-4- (non-(2) of the previous ruling) that has already been used for a nonobligatory use such as the sunnas of rinsing out the mouth, renewing ablution when there has been no intervening state of ritual impurity, or a sunna purificatory bath;
-5- or water that has already been used (n: to lift a state of ritual impurity) and has now been added together until it amounts to 216 liters or more.
@E1.9: Water Is Affected by User's Contact
With less than 216 liters, if a person performing ablution (after washing his face once) or the purificatory bath (after making intention for it) makes the intention in his heart to use his hands to scoop up the water, then the introduction of his hands into this amount of water does not make the water used.
But if not (O: if he does not make this intention at all, or does so after putting his hands in the water, which is less than 216 liters), then the rest of the water is considered as already used (n: and no longer purifying. But in the Maliki school (dis: c6.4 (end) ), it is valid (though offensive) to lift a state of ritual impurity with water that has already been used for that purpose (al-Sharh al-saghir'ala Aqrab al-Malik ila madhhab al-Imam Malik (y35), 1.37) ).
@E1.10: 216 or More Liters of Water (Qullatayn)
As for 216 liters or more of water, even if two or more persons in a state of major ritual impurity (janaba, def; e10) are immersed in it, whether simultaneously or serially, their impurity is lifted and the water does not thereby become used (n: but remains purifying).
@E1.11: 216 Liters Remains Purifying Even After Use
Qullatayn (lit. "two great jars") roughly equal five hundred Baghdad ritls, and their volume is one and a quarter dhira in height, width, and length.
(n: The definition of qullatayn as being 216 liters is based on estimating the dhira' at fortyeight centimeters. Metric equivalents of Islamic weights and measures are given at w15.)
@E1.12: 216 Liters Becomes Impure by Change from Impurities
Two hundred and sixteen liters of water does not become impure by mere contact with filth, but only becomes so by changing (n: in taste, color, or smell) because of it, even when (O: this change is) only slight.
@E1.13: 216 Liters Becomes Pure If the Change Disappears
If such change (n: in 216 liters or more of water) disappears by itself (O: such as through standing at length) or by water is used or impure) then the water in again purifying.
@E1.14
But the 216 liters of water does not become purifying if the change disappears by (O: putting) such things as musk (O: in it, or ambergris, or camphor, which mask the Scent; or putting saffron and the like in which mask the color) or vinegar (O: which masks the taste) or earth.
@E1.15: Contact with Filth Makes Under 216 liters Impure
Less than 216 liters becomes impure by mere contact with filth, whether the water changes or not, unless filth falls into it whose amount (N: before it falls in is so small that it) is indiscernible by eyesight (A eyesight, here and for all rulings, meaning an average look, not a negligent glance nor yet a minute inspection), or if something dead falls into it of creatures without flowing blood, such as flies and the like, in both of which cases it remains purifying. This is equally true of running or still water.
@E1.16: Reaching 216 Liters Purifies Less Than 216 Liters
When less than 216 liters of impure water is added to (O: even if with impure water) until is amounts to 216 liters or more and no change (def: below) remains in it, then it is (O: has become) purifying.
@E1.17: Meaning of Change in Water
Change, resulting from something